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BROUWER'S ANTICIPATION
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY*
by Göran Sundholm
Dedicated to J. J. de longh
on the occasion of his 70th birthday.
My aim in the present paper is modest and mainly one of
exposition: I want to re-examine some of Brouwer's views on the
nature and function of language and present them in such a way
that their close affinity with currently popular topics in the
philosophy of language is brought out. Such a task seems
worthwhile in that one not infrequently encounters the claim
that Brouwer's position on meaning is out-and-out psychologist io
in character. In view of my title it is no surprise that the topics
from the philosophy of language are taken from within the
theory of radical interpretation. The plan of my paper is as
follows: in an introductory section some of the different
formulations of the Principle of Charity that have been given in
the literature are reviewed in order to continue with an
exposition of Brouwer's general philosophy of intuitionism and,
in particular, his philosophy of language as presented in three of
his lectures1. The resulting picture of language is then compared
with the theory of radical interpretation. In two digressions
analogies with GarnapsAujbau and (spät) Wittgensteinian rule-
following are hinted at. Finally, I spell out some consequences
that my reading of Brouwer's philosophy of language will have
for the philosophy of (constructive) mathematics.
These matters of organization having been dealt with, it is a
* Merlin« öl Ihr Aristotel ian Society nr l<1 at 5/7 Tavistork Place, London WC1, on
Monday, 27 February, 1984 at 6.00 p.m. A postal delay made it impossible to print l Im
paper in the Proterdtng\ for 1983/4.
'L. E. ]. Brouwer 'Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Spraehe', Monatshefte f. Math u.
Phys. 36 (1929), pp. 153-164.
'Willen, wrtcn, spicken' in De uitdrukkingswijze der Wetenschap, kentheoretische
voordrachten gehouden aan de l 'n ivers i tc i t van Amsterdam (1932-1933), pp. 43-63.
Also m Kuclidcs ((ironingen), Vol. 9 (1933), pp. 177-193.
'Consciousness. Philosophy and Mathematics', Proc. 10th intern. Congress of Philosophy,
North-Hol land. Amsterdam 1948, pp. 1235-1249.
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great pleasure to have the opportunity to conclude this opening
paragraph by acknowledging many helpful conversations with
Professor J. J. de longh on the foundations and philosophy of
mathematics in general and how Brouwer could (or should!) be
interpreted in particular. Although Professor de longh is likely
to disagree with most of my conclusions, it is through these
conversations that I have come to appreciate just how different
Brouwer's position is from what popular expositions take it to
be.
I
In an introductory section, I hope, one may be forgiven for once
again covering very well-known ground.2 The Principle of
Charity began life as part of'an investigation into the nature of
individuals', and it was, in fact, a very straightforward state-
ment of a Description Theory of Proper Names3:
And so we act on what might be called the Principle of
Charity. We select as designatum that individual which
will make the largest possible number o f . . . statements
true. . . . We might say that the designatum is that
individual which satisfies more of the asserted matrices
containing the [name in question] than does any other
individual.4
and
How does an individual manage to get itself hooked onto
by an individual constant? The answer now lies before us.
It does so by having those characteristics in virtue of which
it satisfies more of the asserted matrices containing the
constant in question than does any other individual.5
Many (and in my generation, I would say, most) students of
Philosophical Logic and the philosophy of language would not
2Mardonald, G. and P. ¥tn\l, Semantics andSurtalSiienir, Ch. 1, RoutIrdtfr and KeRan
Paul, London 1981, is a good sourer of background inlormation.
'Srr S. Kripkr, Naming and Necnsity, Bla< kwrll, Oxford 1980, pp. 64-70.
4N. L. Wilson, 'Subsumes Without Substrata', Review of Metaphysics 12 (1958-9),
p. 532.
'Wilson, op. rit., p. 535.
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immediately associate the Principle of Charity with a Description
Theory of Proper Names such as that given by Wilson in the
above quotes. The principle which some of us got to know as that
of Charity was introduced to us in such passages as:
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that
optimizes agreement should not be conceived as resting on
a charitable assumption about human intelligence that
might turn out to be false. If we cannot find a way to
interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a creature
as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by
our own standards, we have no reason to count that
creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying
anything.6
and
The general policy is. . . to choose truth conditions that do
as well as possible in making speakers hold sentences true
when (according to the theory and the theory builder's
view of the facts) those sentences are true.7
Here, in this version, the Principle of Charity is an a priori
constraint on a project of radical interpretation: how should one
best set about connecting the recursion clauses of a Tarskian
truth-theory with how speakers actually use their language?
The latter Principle of Charity gives an answer to this question.
One should maximize agreement between truth (as seen by the
interpreter) and what is held true by the speakers as shown by
their (sincere) assertions. In a certain sense this Davidsonian
version of the Principle of Charity may be viewed as a more or
less natural extension of the original Wilsonian variant. There
referents of proper names are fixed by means of weighted fit and,
similarly, in the Davidson version, the (extension of a) Tarskian
T-predicate is determined by means of weighted fit. One can, as
a matter of fact, find echoes of the Wilson Principle also in the
writings of Davidson. Consider, e.g. the following well-known
passage:
''I) Davidson, 'Radical Interpretation', Dialectica 27 (1973), p. 324.
'D. Davidson, 'Belief and the Basis of 'Meaning', Synthese 27 (1974), p. 320
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how clear are we that the ancients—some ancients—believed
that the earth was flat? This earth? Well, this earth of ours is
part of the solar sytem, a system partly identified by the
fact that it is a gaggle of large, cool, solid bodies circling
around a very large, hot star. If someone believes none of
this about the earth, is it certain that it is the earth that he is
thinking about?8
Colin McGinn9 has critized Davidson's introduction of a
referential scheme via the Principle of Charity on the basis of
Kripke-style counter-arguments to the Description Theory of
Proper Names10. He observes that such arguments show the
autonomy of reference and (sentence-) truth in a theory of
meaning. If we read off a scheme of reference from truth as
determined according to Davidsonian Charity the result will be
something like the Wilson variant and I agree with McGinn that
this is unsatisfactory. What is unsatisfactory is that one of the
two anchors of a Fregean theory of meaning"—the category of
Proper Names—has its semantics completely reduced to that of
the other, namely the category of Sentences. Thus the error
seems to lie not so much in the use of Charity but in the
suppression of reference as an independent notion.12
In fact, if we start our Charity considerations, not with the
Wilson formulation, but with the Davidsonian variant, then the
former is not the natural version of Charity for proper names.
The following seems a better analogy with Charity: choose as
referent of a name that individual to whom most speakers take it
to refer. In this way the autonomy of reference is respected and
the Principles of Charity for truth and reference are completely
analogous. One should note that, just as there is a problem
about identifying the 'sign of assent' in the case of Charity for
sentences, there will be a corresponding problem of identifying
*D. Davidson, 'Thought and Talk' in S. Guttenplan (editor), Mind and Ijinguagr,
O.U.P. 1975, p. 21.
"Charity, Interpretation, and Belief, Journal of Philosophy, LXXIV (1977), pp.
521-535.
'"Kripke, op.cit.
"Sec Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference, Ch. 1, O.U.P. 1983, for a lucid
exposition.
'
2Indeed, Davidson has carried this position to its logical conclusion in his 'Reality
Without Reference', reprinted in Mark Platts (editor), Refermer, Truth and Reality,
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1980.
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the 'sign of reference' for the case of Charity for names. I will not,
however, further investigate whether or not this formulation of
Charity would stand up against the criticism of McGinn. Such
an inquiry would take me far outside the scope of the present
paper and, furthermore, there is growing agreement that
Charity in the sense of Davidson is not what really matters in the
construction of a theory of meaning:
The point of the notion of sense . . . is thus tied to our
interest in the understanding of behaviour, and ultimately
our interest in the understanding—the fathoming—of
people. We have not properly made sense of forms of words
in a language if we have not, thereby, got some way
towards making sense of its speakers.13
The Principle of Charity has been approached in this spirit by
e.g. David Lewis14:
it would be more charitable to make allowances for the
likelihood that [the speaker's] circumstances—his life
history of evidence and training, . . .—may have led him
understandably into error. We should at least forbear from
ascribing to [him] those of our beliefs and desires which. . .
he has been given no reason to share. We should even
ascribe to him those errors which we think we would have
made, or should have made, if our evidence and training
had been like his.
McGinn explicitly refrains from arguing against the formulation
of Lewis and he finds 'charity as to finding others consistent and
rational highly compelling"5. The present version of Charity
was dubbed the Principle of Humanity by Richard Grandy:16
we have, as a pragmatic constraint on translation, the
condition that the imputed pattern of relations among
beliefs, desires and the world be as similar to our own as
possible
'
3John McDowell, 'On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name', reprinted in Platts
(editor), op.rit., p. 142.
'''Radical Interpretation', Synthese 27 (1974), p. 336.
'''McGinn, op.cit., p. 535.
'"Reference, Meaning, and Belief, Journal of Philosophy LXX (1973), p. 443.
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and it is this last formulation that I want to keep in mind in the
next section where a review of Brouwer's lectures is given.
II
Brouwer's mature views about language are most forcefully
presented in the three lectures mentioned above (see note 1),
and, of these, the second—'Willen, weten, spreken'—which was
delivered in Amsterdam 12 December 1932, is most relevant to
my topic. It is a revised and extended Dutch version of the
lecture which was given in Vienna on 10 March 1928 and
which, it is said, brought Wittgenstein back into philosophical
activity. In view of this latter circumstance one expects (or at
least, I expected) that the Brouwer lectures would have been
given careful attention and much commentary from, among
others, Wittgenstein scholars. Somewhat surprisingly this is not
the case, owing perhaps to linguistic difficulties17, and I have
found only two discussions by British philosophers18. The three
lectures, even though they are spread out over a period of twenty
years, present (versions of) a fairly crystallized position which
remains constant in spite of different manners of presentation on
different occasions, and, in fact, essential features of the position
can be traced to Brouwer's very first writings.19
Sometimes one encounters the view that mathematics (usually
in the form of an axiomatic system) has to be justified in terms of
a soundness proof for an appropriate formal semantics, or,
perhaps, by means of a theory of meaning for the mathematical
language in question. Brouwer is diametrically opposed to such
a view; in his opinion mathematics is not responsible either to
logic or to a theory of meaning. On the contrary, logic and
language are not guarantees for, but parasites on, the essentially
individualistic activity of doing mathematics, which does not stand in
need of any justification whatsoever.
"The first, Vienna, lecture is in German. The second is in Dutch, while the third
Ix-gms wi th a warning that Brouwer does not expect to be understood
"(J. T Kneebone, Mathematical tjgif, van Nostrand, 1963, pp. 319-321, and P. M. S.
Hacker, Insight and Illusion, O.U.P. 1912, Ch. IV: 3.
"Cf. W P. van Stip, 'The Rejected Parts of Brouwer's Dissertation on the
Foundations of Mathematics', Historia Mathematica 6 (1974), pp. 385-404. Here I also
want to take the opportunity to express a general debt to van Stigt's unpublished
doctoral dissertation Brouwer's Intuitwmsm, London 1971.
L
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Brouwer opens his lecture by singling out two levels of the
autonomous activity of mathematics, namely mathematical
attention and mathematical abstraction. Both are basic forms of
action of the individual's will to live. There are two stages of
mathematical attention: temporal attention and causal attention.
The former, temporal attention, or, perception of the move of time,
'may be described as the falling apart of a lifemoment into two
different things, one of which gives way to the other, but is
retained by memory'20. Through this relegation of one thing to
memory it is separated from the I and becomes part of'the world
of sensation experienced by mind'21. This temporal duality, or
pair of temporal appearances, in its turn, may be viewed as a
member of a new duality and thus the three-member sequence
of temporal appearances arises. In this way, Brouwer says,
through 'selfdeployment' (= iteration?) of the intellectual
Urphenomenon, one will get the sequence ojtemporal appearances of
arbitrary multiplicity. Here I will depart from Brouwer's order of
exposition in order to be able to register one of my difficulties
with his view. He proceeds by illustrating the causal attention
before explaining mathematical abstraction, and I want to reverse
the order of his account.22 The temporal attention does not
suffice to give mathematics. For this we need the mathematical
Urintuition which results from divesting the temporal dualities
of all objectual content so that only the pure form, 'the common
substratum', of all pairs remains. Through selfdeployment of the
Urintuition all of mathematics, and in particular the natural
numbers, are generated. My difficulty is that, while I can
understand (?) how one reaches each individual number through
successive repetitions of the Urintuition, I do not see how one
20This is a part of the 'Kirst Art of Intuitionism', Brouuvr's (Cambridge Iscturrs on
Intuuwnvm (I), van Dalcn, editor), C.U.P. 1981, p. 4. Brouwer remained faithful to this
characterization of the Urphenomenon throughout his career. Already among the
rejected parts of the dissertation from 1907 we find
The primordial phenomenon is simply the intuition of time in which repetition of
"thing in time and again thing" is possible [van Stigt, op.cit., p. 394]
and similar passages can be found in many of Brouwer's writings from the intervening
years.
2
'German: Anschauungswelt. Dutch: Aanschouwingswereld. The translation I use is
the one preferred by Brouwer in analogous passages from the 1948 lecture.
221
 Account' in the sense ol description and not in t he sense of justification. Brouwer docs
not give an account in the latter sense He tells us what he does and how. I just don't
understand him at this point.
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gets the notion 'pure form of (temporal) sequence of arbitrary
multiplicity'. That is, I do not see how one proceeds from the
individual numbers, or pure forms, 0,1,2,3, . . . to the grasp of
Number, without the use of something more. In fact, if
selfdeployment means iteration (and if it does not, I don't even
see how to reach the individual numbers), then the notion of
Number is already built into the selfdeployment. (Cf. Wittgenstein,
'A number is an exponent of an operation.', Tractatus 6.021.)23
Mathematical abstraction does not just give us the Urintuition
of mathematics. It can also interact with causal attention in order
to formulate scientific laws. The causal attention consists in the
(mental) 'identification' of different sequences of appearances,
and the result is called a causal sequence. A particular instance of
causal attention is given by the condensation of individual
'things', that is, Brouwer says, causal sequences that are 'simple
or complex units which persist in the world of sensation
experienced by mind'. They are 'permutable' in time and
completely separated from the subject. It should be stressed that
for Brouwer, both temporal and causal attention are 'free-will-
phenomena', which, so to speak, can be switched on and off at
will. In the exercise of his will to live the individual subject uses
causal attention for cunning acts2*, and hereby causal connections
in the world are brought about by the subject. (Brouwer
emphasizes that there are no causal connections in the world,
except for those which are thus created by the subject. ) Through
the cunning act, a desired member of a causal sequence (the aim)
is realized indirectly by the bringing about of another member
of the sequence (which need not be desirable on its own) (the
means). An example would be filling a glass of water as a means
towards realizing the aim of quenching thirst. Through cunning
acts the subject creates, and maintains, a causal sphere of influence.
This causal sphere influences, and is self influenced by, the
conative activity of the subject, in that threatening appearances
are eliminated, while useful ones are added to it. Mathematical
21W. W. Tait, 'Finitism', Journal of Philosophy LXXVIII (1981), pp. 539-540, and
'Against Intuitionism', Journal of Philosophical Logic (12), pp. 173-182 treats of this
and related problems.
24This concept can be traced back already to I Men, Kunst en Mystiek from 1905.
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abstraction now interacts with causal attention in that several
causal sequences are subsumed under a common form or law.
Here, according to Brouwer, lies the starting point of exact
science.
A Viennese digression. The history of ideas is full of striking
coincidences of simultaneous discoveries of similar results by one
or more researchers. The discovery of the planet Neptune is
perhaps the most spectacular instance. The different, but
equivalent, formulations of Quantum Mechanics by Heisenberg
and Schrödinger give another well-known example. The
Foundations of Mathematics provide many instances around
1930: Tarski and Herbrand proved the Deduction Theorem,
Gentzen and Jaskowski discovered Natural Deduction, Church
and Turing proved the Undecidability theorem etc.. It is a
striking coincidence that, at the very time when Brouwer
delivered his 'Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache' in
Vienna, Carnap must have been busy preparing his Logische
Aufbau der Welt for the press. (The preface is dated May 1928.)
Carnap's infinitely more detailed account has many similarities
with Brouwer's position. Brouwer constructs his world through,
or perhaps better, tells us that his world is given through, among
other things, persisting causal sequences. Carnap uses, as the
basic elements of his construction system, what he calls
'elementary experiences'. (This is a primitive concept, but
might perhaps be understood as a section of the stream of
consciousness.) The central relation between these is that of a
'likeness recollection' and from this a world is built. Objects
become regularities in the stream of elementary experiences
(which strongly reminds one of Brouwer's 'identifications'). The
name of Carnap's position—methodological solipsism—describes
Brouwer's view in a most appropriate way. The crucial
difference between the two is that Carnap is a 'constructionist'
or translator. He wants to show that on the basis of his primitives
he can, using the logic of Principia, give definitions of the
concepts one needs in order to talk about the world. Brouwer, on
the other hand, does nothing of the sort. He tells us what his
world is like, and not what you would have to do to translate
your world into his.
Brouwer and his lecture do not get mentioned in the Außau,
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but we know from Carnap's 'Intellectual Autobiography'25 that
he heard Brouwer. There can be no question of any direct
influence, however. The first draft of the Aufbau was written in
the years 1922-1925, well before Brouwer's visit to Vienna, but
it remains an interesting task to work out the comparison
between the two in some detail.
Any higher degree of complexity in the use of mathematical
attention and, in particular, mathematical abstraction, pre-
supposes that the subject has progressed beyond the most
primitive stages of cultural organization and development. It is
only at the more advanced levels that the third basic manifestation
of the individual's will to live comes into action, namely the
imposition of will by means of sound. This is the origin and sole
function of language; it is sometimes in the individual's self-
interest to subordinate his will to that of another being in order
that, say, their causal spheres of influence should work in unison.
To this end, in order to direct the work of other wills, there arises
the need for the transmission of will between subjects. All other
uses and functions of language are parasitic on this public role.
There is, however, no certain guarantee that the transmission of
will takes place as desired. This, then, is the reason why
language is an imperfect vehicle for mathematical activity; one
can never be sure that the mathematical acts that have been
carried out by one subject can be transmitted to another
through language. Mathematics remains an essentially languageless
activity. The subject has to carry out his mathematical acts,
perform his constructions through more or less complex
iterations of the Urintuition, and there is no way to ensure that
another subject can copy, or even imitate, the constructions in
question. (Causal sequences are individuated in subjects so
copying seems out of the question.) That communication
succeeds, at least partially, is due to the empirical circumstance
that in an organized social community there is sufficent
uniformity in the structure of the desire-patterns of the different
individual wills. Through drill in language-use, through social
and moral conventions, religious beliefs, and so on, a sufficient
parallelism is ensured for the operation of the wills of different
"The Philosophy ofRudolfCarnap, (P. A. Schilpp, editor), Open Court, La Salle, 1963,
p. 49.
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individuals to make communication at least partially possible.
This thesis of the parallelism of wills bears a strong resemblance
to Grandy's Humanity constraint, but Brouwer uses his thesis the
other way round. In the theory of radical interpretation it is taken
as known that we do understand each other,26 and then, in order
to account for how this is at all possible, a homologous structure
of propositional attitudes to that of our own is postulated in the
subjects of interpretation. Brouwer, on the other hand, notes
that, as a matter of empirical fact, such homology exists, at least
to some degree, and that, hence, at least partial communication
is sometimes possible.
His anticipation of topics from the theory of radical interpret-
ation goes further than this though. In his discussion of the use of
causal attention in conjunction with mathematical abstraction,
he observes, apropos the idea of a scientific theory of one's fellow
beings, that
It is an essential hypothesis for mathematical contemplation
of one's fellow men to assume that in each there is present a
mathematico-scientific mechanism of attention, action and
reflection.27
and also that
It is an essential presupposition for understanding between
human beings that in each the structure of rational
contemplation is the same.28
In conclusion let us note that Brouwer is very sceptical of, and
sometimes even hostile to, language29. It therefore seems
appropriate to take note of the fact that he is a great master of its
use. His Dutch, in particular, has very distinctive features, and it
is almost impossible to improve on, or to paraphrase, his various
formulations.
2fi
"We do understand each other! That's a datum" as Michael Dummett put it in a
panel-discussion in Nijmegen, October I9H:(.
"Brouwer, op.cil. 1932, p. fi .
2
"loc.cil., p. 8. My translat ion in l>oth cases
""Hacking, ll'hv !)/ir\ Language Mailer Tit Philosophy?, C.U.P., p. 149, comments on the
value judgements tha t are built into the names of the Principles of Chanty and
Humanity. Is i t , in fact, charitable to assume that someone speaks the t r u t h when he
asserts what we assert? And do only they count as human who believe and fed U we do?
These questions arc very much in the spui t ol Brouwer.
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Another Viennese digression. The subject matter of mathematics is
given by the Urintuition and is private to the subject. Language,
on the other hand, is through and through social. Hence,
mathematics is, and remains, an essentially languageless
activity. This could perhaps be called a 'private language
argument'. Indeed, if we recollect a more famous private
language argument, it is instructive to realize that the objects of
mathematics would have to be given in a private language such
as is ruled out by Wittgenstein. Another point of connection lies
in Brouwer's insistence on the free-will character of the
mathematical acts; we are free to carry out our constructions as
we please. If in a causal sequence I should choose to iterate, say,
2000,2002,2004,2008 instead of 2000,2002,2004,2006, who
could find me wrong? To everyone his own mathematical
activity, and if, by transmitting beautiful constructions to other
subjects, he can give someone pleasure through the beauty of the
construction, so much the better. I have here cast a Wittgensteinian
example in a Brouwerian setting. It seems a worthwhile task to
make a detailed study of the Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics and compare it with Brouwer's Vienna lecture.
It is also interesting to note that when David Bloor30 attempts
to carry out a 'strong programme for the sociology oTknowledge'
for mathematics and logic on the basis of Wittgenstein's work,
the position he reaches shows strong similarities with a position
that can be extrapolated from Brouwer's view, namely the
position which results from a reversal of Brouwer's chain of
thought: start with his view on language and apply this to
mathematical discourse in order to read off a philosophy of
mathematics. Indeed, first Wittgenstein builds on Brouwer and
then Bloor is able to discover a Brouwerian position in
Wittgenstein.
Ill
In this section I want to indicate briefly what consequences a
literal reading of Brouwer will have for the philosophy of
mathematics. If we take his word for what he takes himself to be
doing, it appears that the current practice for investigations of
'"David Bloor, 'Wittgenstein and Mannheim on the Sociology of Mathematics', Stud.
Hist. Phil. Sei. 4 (1973), pp. 173-91.
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intuitionistic mathematics is all wrong, or at least at strong
variance with what the Founder of Intuitionism thought and
how he worked. Nowadays, constructive mathematics in
general, and intuitionism in particular, are often presented as
axiomatic extensions of Heyting's basic axiom system for first-
order intuitionistic logic, very much in the style of classical first-
order theories with the primitive vocabularies and non-logical
axioms. Such a separation of logic and mathematics is not to the
taste of Brouwer; logic is in no way prior to mathematics. On the
contrary, a 'logical law' is valid because for each 'instance' of the
law one can in fact carry out the construction as required. It is
not that the mathematical action can be performed because the
law is valid; the explanatory effect goes in the other direction
according to Brouwer.
Michael Dummett, in his review of Brouwer's Collected
Works*1, gives an elegant and lucid presentation of meaning-
theoretical issues that he finds at the root of intuitionism. He
ascribes three principles to Brouwer, namely
(i) mathematical statements have content
(ii) this content is given in terms of what counts as a proof
of it
(iii) the meaning of any statement must be determined by
its composition.
These principles, however, do not square with Brouwer's own
account of his mathematical activity. There is, according to
him, no such thing as the content of a mathematical statement.
The notion of meaning is hopelessly imprecise and one cannot
base mathematical activity thereon. To talk about definite
contents and determination of meaning for mathematical
statements makes no sense for Brouwer: his mathematics is an
essentially languageless activity. On the other hand, Dummett's
principles give a quite precise description of Constructive mathematics
as based on Heyting's semantical explanations of logical and
mathematical concepts. Elsewhere32,1 have dealt with Heyting's
formulations in some detail and tried to show how they should
"Mind LXXXIX (1980), pp. 605-615.
"'Constructions, Proofs and the Meaning of the Logical Constants', Journal of
Philosophical Logic 12 (1983), pp. 151-172.
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be read. I argue there that one must differentiate between
Heyting the Brouwerian intuitionist and Heytingthesemanticist
of constructivism. Dummett is impressed by the circumstance
that 'within the framework provided by the fundamental
principles (i)-(iii), Brouwer was as permissive as possible'. I do
not think that Brouwer worked within the framework (i)-(iii),
but Heyting the semanticist did, and it is certainly true that
Brouwer was permissive. Heyting does not give his 'proof-
explanations' for typically intuitionist conceptions, such as
quantification over choice sequences. If the standard explanations
were applicable there also, one ought to be able to decide the
status of Brouwer's Bar Theorem at once, but it is, and remains,
a controversial principle.
The moral I want to draw is this: Heyting and Brouwer were not
engaged in the same enterprise, and, therefore, one should be wary of
applying the semantical schemes of Heyting to the writings of Brouwer.
Nevertheless, an interesting technical question suggests itself as
a suitable conclusion of my paper. Heyting explained propositions
as intentions towards constructions (which when carried out
produce construction-objects of certain types) and showed how
the logical constants correspond with certain operations on
construction-objects, e.g. pair-formation for conjunction and
function-abstraction for implication and universal quantification.
Is it possible to find a 'non-standard' model of this notion of proposition
(with its ensuing theory of constructions) for which Brouwer's
practice, e.g. in the form of the Bar Theorem, is validated?
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